GLOBAL GOVERNANCE AND POLICY PROCESSES

Working Paper
GLOBAL GOVERNANCE AND POLICY PROCESSES
Global Networks, NGOs, and Environmental Movements in Korea
Yooil Bae
Postdoctoral Fellow
Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy
National University of Singapore
469C Bukit Timah Road, Level 2
Oei Tiong Ham Building
Singapore 259772
Email Address: sppby@nus.edu.sg
Phone: +65) 6516-7820
Word Count:
9,114
Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy Working Paper
National University of Singapore 2008
ABSTRACT
Recent international social movement literatures argue that the emergence of transnational non-governmental actors as new stakeholders in governance is reshaping the map of states’ political processes, and the growth of civil society in both domestic and international stages has made political dynamics and power relations more complicated. This paper, drawing on case studies of three environmental movements in a transitional society, Korea, attempts to test the contrasting perspectives on the activities and influence of transnational advocacy networks on domestic policy processes. This paper explores the conditions of the emergence of transnational cooperation in environmental governance issues in a nation. By suggesting a multilevel analysis of social movements, I argue that institutional arrangement and policy settings in a country such as the degree of democratization, the growth of non-profit sector, and the emergence of civilian government are the driving force of facilitating or restricting the intervention of transnational advocacy networks, although the activities of transnational advocacy networks are becoming more and more indispensable political resources for the movements. The analysis of global actors’ participation in domestic policy processes requires a closer multilevel analysis highlighting the political dynamics in national and local as well as transnational level.
■ Keywords: Environmental Movement, Transnational Advocacy Networks, Global Governance, mobilization, democratization
Acknowledgement: I would like to thank Professor Apichai Shipper, Jefferey Sellers, Russell Dalton, Yong Wook Lee, Dong-Ae Shin, and two anonymous reviewers at the Center for International Studies, University of Southern California for insightful comments on the initial draft. I also thank Center for Law, History, and Culture at USC for financial assistance. The previous version of the paper was presented at the Greening Conference XIII, January 24, 2004, Los Angeles, California, and at the annual meeting of Western Political Science Association, March 17-19, 2005, Oakland, California.
1
Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy Working Paper
National University of Singapore 2008
The crisis of governance in contemporary world is related to the erosion of political authorities characterized by increasing gap between citizens and their representatives (Rosenau, 2000; Strange, 1996). Traditional tools of governance – such as governmental institutions and politicians – are not sufficient to respond to emerging complicated social issues such as the environment, human rights, corruption, poverty, and so forth (Castells, 2005; Held and McGrew, 2004; Keohane and Nye, 2000). In particular, emergence of non-governmental actors as new stakeholders in policy processes, as well as of other diverse social actors, is reshaping the map of traditional image of policy processes in subnational, national, and supranational politics (Pierre, 2000).
The rapidly growing civil society and non-profit sector on both domestic and international stages are trying to fill the current void in political representation and legitimacy in policy making (Castells, 2005). The traditional notion of policy process in a nation-state has been that the government (or state) has ability to claim the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territorial jurisdiction,1 but rising private authority from the outside of territory - such as multinational firms, international non-governmental organizations (INGOs), and so on – has made political dynamics and power relations more complicated (Hall and Biersteker, 2002).2 Thus, attention is directed to the effect of international context on national socio-economic system and national polities (Garrett and Lange
At first glance, transnational non-governmental actors may seem very influential
1 Weber, Max. 1948. Politics as a Vocation. In H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (eds.), From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, pp.77-78.
2 The phenomenon is what is so called, “governance,” instead of government. By governance, I mean both formal and informal processes and institutional dynamics that foster or restrain collective actions in a society (Peters and Pierre, 1998; Nye and Donahue, 2000). This is also what Hall and Biersteker (2002) called “rise of private authority” in comparison with the transnational notion of public authority of government authority.
2
Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy Working Paper
National University of Singapore 2008
in East Asian countries where traditional image of strong state has dominated the policy processes. For example, when Taiwanese government attempted to export its nuclear wastes to North Korea in 1997, Green Peace - one of the biggest transnational environmental movement organizations in the world – closely worked with South Korean environmental groups to stop the Taiwan Power Company’s export, and successfully prevented export was successful.3 In addition, by cooperating with domestic social groups Amnesty International – one of the biggest human rights organization – engaged indirectly with the issue of National Security Law (NSL) which largely restricts social movements, freedom of speech, and so forth (He, 2004).4 In contrast, recent studies on the rapid growth of civil society in Korea argue that institutional change– i.e. democratic transition – instead of globalization effect, allows the civic politics of political dissent including the participation of transnational actors (for example, Bae, 2004; Kim, 2000; Lim and Tang, 2002). That is, the role and activities of transnational advocacy networks may be limited in the governance issues of developing or transitional societies (Dalton et al., 2003).
Along with the wave of globalization, the growing literature testifies to the emerging importance of transnational collective action in defining the boundaries of nation-state’s policy processes (He, 2004; Keane, 2003; Smith, 2001a). Growing awareness of transnational NGO actors in domestic political process brought controversies regarding the role and influence of those actors on defining the boundaries and identities of nation-states (Keane, 2003; Keck and Sikkink, 1998; Porta et al., 1999; Smith et al., 1997). For example, Keck and Sikkink (1998) argued that in certain
3 Green Peace, http://archive.greenpeach.org/pressreleases/nucwaste/1997may15.htm.
4 Such as opposition parties, student movement organizations, and so on.
3
Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy Working Paper
National University of Singapore 2008
countries – such as those in Latin America – INGOs played a significant role in changing nation-state’s policies when domestic policy channels were totally blocked. Some scholars value the notion of ‘civic politics,’ emphasizing the role of non-state actors in solving governance issues in world politics (Smith et al., 1997; Wapner, 1996). In contrast, many political scientists and sociologists emphasize the importance of “domestic institutional arrangement and policy settings” that cultivate the condition of transnational intervention on domestic policy processes, downplaying the significance of the activities of transnational activists themselves (Castells, 2005; Rohrschneider and Dalton, 2002; Tarrow, 1998, 2000).5 However, despite these theoretical controversies toward transnational cooperation in governance issues, there have been few empirical researches concerning those activities in newly industrialized (or democratized) countries in East Asian regions (He, 2004; McCarthy, 1997).6 Recent researches on both national and international social movements have been shifting their attention gradually to the transnational activities in non-western and non-democratic countries (Smith et al., 1997), but there are still limited attempts to examine those transnational cooperations in transitional societies like East Asian regions.
The aim of this paper is to empirically testify two contrasting perspectives on the activities of transnational advocacy networks (hereafter TANs) and their cooperation with domestic social movement organizations (SMOs) in policymaking processes by addressing the following questions: how do interactions between TANs and SMOs occur
5 In general, scholars in international relations emphasize the effect of globalization on domestic politics, while political scientists and sociologists studying ‘social movements’ value the nation-specific context (Porta et al., 1999).
6 McCarthy (1997) pointed out that social movement studies on both domestic and international stage have been centered on western democracies. For example, about 70% of international NGOs are located in five western cities (Brussels, London, Paris, Washington D.C., and New York). See Anheier et al. (2002), pp.6.
4
Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy Working Paper
National University of Singapore 2008
in domestic policymaking processes in a country where there has been strict separation between domestic and international arena? What are the tactics of both TANs and SMOs to challenge the implementation of policies by the government? Under what condition do social movement actors cooperate with transnational actors?
My analyses are based on case analyses of three environmental movements – Shiwha Lake Reclamation, Tong-River Dam and Saemangum Reclamation Project - that caused nation-wide controversies in South Korea. Although cases studies on specific social movements provide limited bases of generalization on the two hypotheses – i.e. globalization versus institution hypotheses – the method can illustrate detailed processes of civic politics and argumentation. In addition, I interviewed domestic environmental activists who were deeply involved in transnational cooperation and environmental movements. In doing so, without losing sight of a globalization perspective, the paper argues that unlike globalization theory, transnational activism on nation-state’s governance issues occurs when the state’s policy channels are diversified, not blocked, under the democratic regime, although transnational cooperation becomes a ‘symbolically’ indispensable political resource as a supporting structure to legitimize opposition parties against the state policies. Only a close examination of political dynamics at national and local levels can fully illuminate why.
Perspectives on Globalization and TANs: An Analytical Framework
The concept of ‘globalization’ has been one of the most significant theoretical frameworks in the last couple of decades. It is hard to pass a day without some reference
5
Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy Working Paper
National University of Singapore 2008
to globalization in the mass media, and it also appears everywhere in academic journals and books (Castells, 2005). Following the collapse of socialist states and the consolidation of capitalist system worldwide, the academic and public discussion of globalization has been intensified dramatically (Held and McGrew, 2004). With the growth of information and transportation technologies, politics, economy, culture, and social movements, which had previously been considered to be strictly separated between domestic and international arenas, expanded throughout the world (Castells, 2005). The destination of discussion regarding globalization is presumably some form of ‘global society,’ or ‘global age,’ but there is considerable controversy as to its key features and its consequences.
Along with the growth of debates regarding the effect of globalization, recent studies on social movement and civil society are increasingly paying attention to the role and influence of ‘transnational advocacy networks.’ TAN – or transnational social movement organizations - is based on a trans-nationally organized relationship among committed and goal-oriented ethical actors involved in diverse policy issues such as value-laden controversies over human rights, environmental problems, women issues, and so forth to promote changes in status quo (Keck and Sikkink, 1998; Smith, 1997).7 Diverse actors can be included in the category of TANs as Keck and Sikkink (1998: 9) noted: international and domestic social movement organizations, churches, trade unions, foundations, the media, intellectuals, and so forth, but international and domestic social movement actors occupy core positions. Groups in this network share a certain value or
7 For Smith et al. (1997), international nongovernmental organizations (INGOs) and transnational social movement organizations (TSMOs) are different concepts. The former is organized to provide services and advance their members’ interests, and reinforce status quo. However, TSMOs pursue progressive changes in debatable policy areas (Smith et al., 1997: 12-13).
6
Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy Working Paper
National University of Singapore 2008
identity toward social issues and they frequently exchange knowledge and information. By providing a network of relations for the diffusion of the knowledge and information, TANs facilitate the changes in public perception and attitude on social problmes in nations, and encourage participation in policy processes (Smith et al., 1997).
However, recent theoretical perspectives regarding the causes, tactics, and effects of the activities of TANs are divided into two directions: a) globalization thesis and b) institutional thesis. In the following section of the paper, I briefly indicate the different ways in which the concepts of globalization and the emergence of TANs have been employed. The central contention here is whether the activities of transnational advocacy networks are indispensable elements in explaining processes and outcomes of domestic policy in the era of globalization.
Globalization and TANs
The term globalization is a fashionable one which has been used to refer to multiple meanings – often competing – and emphases. Despite this ambiguity, it is important to recognize that one of the most important qualities in terms of policy processes is as a powerful discourse that shapes domestic and international debates bringing the change of the traditional image of the role of state in the processes (Beeson, 2001; Strange, 1996). Because globalization is not a single or fixed condition, it would be beneficial to conceive the concept through the investigation of several features of globalization, especially economy, politics, and culture (Held and McGrew, 2004).
First, the global economy includes flow of goods, services, capital, and technologies as well as information and perception that accompany market change.
7
Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy Working Paper
National University of Singapore 2008
Through the activities of multinational corporations, increase of international trades, and the evolution of internet, the world economy is gradually integrated into a single market order, a global economy (Castells, 2005; Keohane and Nye, 2000). As the global economy and competition intensify, national governments are increasingly unable to increase public expenditure or welfare spending that are constrained by the dictates of global markets, and gradually lose policy tools to control or promote domestic economy (Gourevitch, 1986; Garrett and Lange, 1995).
Second, growing interconnectedness between nations and new transnational institutions have bound sovereign states together, and transformed sovereignty into the shared exercise of power (Rosenau, 2000). Because of these international influences, traditional political authority has been eroded, and the scope of policy choices available to individual governments has been decreased. In addition, there is a growing number of governance issues that require transnational cooperation such as environment, drugs, terrorism, and so forth (Keohane and Nye, 2000). As such, the underlying idea of globalization is that policy processes or social collective actions in a given time and space – i.e. within a nation-state – are gradually conditioned by the effect of globalization (Giddens, 1990).
Parallel to the growth in the number of international institutions and organizations, recently there is the growing number of transnational advocacy networks in diverse policy areas such as environment, human rights, and so forth (Florini and Simmons, 2000; Keck and Sikkink, 1998; Smith et al., 1997). Indeed, acceleration of globalization – rapid expansion of communication, transportation, and technology – apparently coincided with the blossoming of non-governmental actors across the globe. The globalization
8
Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy Working Paper
National University of Singapore 2008
theorists’ perspective on transnational NGOs or TANs is twofold: a) liberal tradition and b) constructivist tradition.
First, the basis of liberal perspective on transnational social movement is the dichotomous relationship between government (or state) and non-governmental actors (or civil society). Liberals may think that too powerful a state is obstructive and intrusive to private rights. However, along with the growth of international trade, communication, and information exchange among countries, transnational “non” governmental actors pluralize political authority and promote democratic process (Keane, 2003). According to Keane (2003: 8-17), transnational non-governmental organizations are characterized by non-governmental actors8, pursuit of universal perspectives on social issues, civility – i.e. non-violence – and trust and cooperation among groups. That is, TANs are non-government actors that pursue universally applicable laws, rules, or norms for social problems and they resist governmental policies peacefully. Accordingly, regarding the activities and influence of TANs on domestic politics, liberal perspective may assume that the growth of TANs increases the democratic policy processes by diversifying political actors in a country, weakens the authority of government, and eventually bring a social change.
Second, school of constructivism sees TAN movement as a process of international norm creation. According to constructivists, high-moral and small number of transnational activists attempt to shape evolution of international norms on social issues and try to change international and national governments’ behavior (Keck and Sikkink, 1998: 25). By exchanging ideas, norms, and discourses through the
8 For liberal perspective, extensive non-governmental actors such as business, unions, lobby groups, civil society, and so forth are included (Keane, 2003). Accordingly, that profit-seeking organizations are included is criticized by other social movement theorists (e.g. constructivist).
9
Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy Working Paper
National University of Singapore 2008
communicative structure of networks, TANs try to change the public perception on social problems, and the state behavior.9 In solving social problems such as environmental pollution, TANs provide international resources available to social movement actors in a nation by brining new ideas, norms, and discourses into policy debates. TANs serve as international resources of information and testimony, and help to transform the practice of national sovereignty (Keck and Sikkink, 1998).10 Thus, according to the constructivist view, norm-creating non-governmental organizations become a unit of analysis – e.g. churches, media, trade unions, local social movements, foundations, intellectuals, and so forth (Keck and Sikkink, 1998: 9).11 TANs are likely to emerge around certain issues where: “a) channels between domestic group and their governments are hampered or severed where such channels are ineffective for resolving a conflict, setting into motion the ‘boomerang’ pattern of influence characteristic of these networks; b) activists or political entrepreneurs believe that networking will further their missions and campaigns, and actively promote them; c) international conferences and other forms of international contacts create arenas for forming and strengthening networks.”12 Accordingly, under the constructivists’ assumption, the activities and influence of TANs on domestic policy issues may depend on a small number of high-moral activists’ communicative and
9 By building a ‘network’ type relation among supranational, national, and subnational actors, TANs attempt to increase the chance for dialogue and exchange (Keck and Sikkink, 1999). The idea of communication structure of network comes from the communicative action or deliberative democracy. For example, Habemas notes that people’s opinion, complaint, and discussion are opened in the public through the communicative action, and people experience identity formation through conversation and reflective discussion. Eventually this experience needs new interpretation of social needs and brings a social change (also see John Rawls). Jurgen Habermas (1996).
10 TANs are called “the third force” (Florini, 2000; Keck and Sikkink, 1998). The first force is state, and the second is business (private sector).
11 Keck and Sikkink (1999: 89) define the scope of TANs as the following: “A transnational advocacy network includes those actors working internationally on an issue, who are bounded by shared values, a common discourse, and dense exchanges of information and services.”
12 Keck and Sikkink (1999: 92-93).
10
Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy Working Paper
National University of Singapore 2008
networking actions that lead the decline of state authority.
Therefore, although there are some different perspectives on TANs in the liberal and constructivist traditions, globalization theses predict that the proliferation of TANs and transnational cooperation may result in the decline of state authority and the promotion of democratic political processes in a nation. By using various tactics13, TANs directly search out social movement allies in order to bring pressure on the state. As a result, globalization theses implicitly assume that most of TANs will come from the North and their activities will be focused on relatively underdeveloped or developing countries, because most information, material resources, and high-moral and educated activists are dependent upon advanced economies as many statistics show (Rohrschneider and Dalton, 2002: 514; Tarrow, 2000: 178).
Institutional Thesis: Policy Settings and Group Characteristics
There are alternative attempts against the advocates of globalization that emphasize nation-specific institutional arrangements and policy settings which facilitate or restrict transnational cooperation in domestic governance issues. As stated above, the globalization thesis implicitly assumes that groups in developing world would gain the most by seeking transnational allies and thus be more likely to engage in transnational cooperation. However, for the skeptics, the concept of transnational movement may be
13 According to Keck and Sikkink (1998), TANs in general use the following four strategies. First, information politics is the ability to provide politically usable information quickly and credibly where it will have the most impact. Second, symbolic politics is the ability to call upon symbols, actions or stories that make sense of a situation or claim for an audience that is frequently far away. Third, leverage politics is the ability to call upon powerful actors to affect a situation where weaker members of a network are unlikely to have influence. Finally, accountability politics is the effort to oblige more powerful actors to act on vaguer policies or principles they formally endorsed. For more detail, see Keck and Sikkink (1998). Also Dalton et al. (2003) listed the typical types of TANs tactics.
11
Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy Working Paper
National University of Singapore 2008
less clear, although the concept of globalization is not completely exclusive for them. That is, activities and influence of transnational advocacy network can refer to various dimensions of social movement, but policy targets, issues, mobilization, and other organizational structures may strictly remain national and local, even when one of these elements take a transnational guise (McCarthy, 1997; Rucht, 1999). The scholars in this line may see the activities of TANs as a continuation of domestic social movements (Rohrschneider and Dalton, 2002), or a differently layered – i.e. locally, nationally, and transnationally – network of social movement (Rucht, 1999). The scholars may emphasize the following: a) political opportunity structure, b) social mobilization, and c) social movement groups’ characteristics.
First, students of social movements who emphasize the “political opportunity structure” may argue that national characteristics constrain national capacity to import transnational cooperation or protest (McCarthy, 1997; Porta et al., 1999; Tarrow, 2000). Pre-existing mobilizing structures – e.g. strong domestic social movement groups that have wide range of networks - influence the development of transnational cooperation. Also, external events and supports from TANs may take on different meanings in different national, cultural, and institutional settings. Tarrow (2000) and numerous sociologists argue that the activities of TANs may proliferate when the power of state is weakened or opened, and that increases the opportunities of international diffusion of mass mobilization (Porta et al., 1999: 9).14
Second, social movement theorists may ask whether the transnational ties or TANs’ activities can be expanded in the absence of local or national mobilization (Tarrow,
14 McCarthy (1996) lists a variety of mobilizing structures for transnational social movement (cited from Smith et al., 1997: 62). 12
Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy Working Paper
National University of Singapore 2008
2000). For them, activities of TANs rely on ‘impersonal’ relationship among members and groups, instead of ‘interpersonal’ relationship that most domestic social movement groups have. Keck and Sikkink (1998) argue that a small number of norm-creating international NGOs influence domestic governance issues, but the argument that those activities without mass mobilization and interpersonal relationship can create transnational community is in doubt for social movement theorists.15 As such, the success of transnational cooperation depends on the level of social mobilization in a nation or locality.
Third, group characteristics thesis emphasizes the goal, ideology, and resources of social movement groups without losing the influence of globalization (Rohrschneider and Dalton, 2002). For example, an environmental group working within government channels would not pose a major challenge to the governmental industrial policies, and is unlikely to bring into play opposition parties such as economic interest groups or companies. In contrast, an environmental group whose goal is to challenge major social paradigm would progressively attempt to make ties with international NGOs to achieve its goal. Social movement groups with substantial amount of resources have a greater chance to attend international conferences and transnational activities (Tarrow, 1998; Zald and McCarthy, 1987). As such, group characteristics thesis shows that individual group’s characteristics such as ideology, resources, goal, and so forth play an important role in explaining the formulation of transnational activities. Social movement theories based on institutional analysis expects that the patterns and types of TANs’ activities will
15 According to social capital theory, frequent face-to-face relationship and organizational meetings can create trust and reciprocity among community members, and those are related to a sense of community. Thus, the absence of interpersonal relationship in globalization thesis may cause a doubt about the creation of international issue community or transnational community (Tarrow, 2000). To see social capital theory, see Smith (2001a), Putnam (1993), and Coleman (1988). 13
Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy Working Paper
National University of Singapore 2008
vary in diverse locations.
Therefore, many of sociologists and social movement theorists may assume the following: first, TANs’ activities would bring the promotion of democratic process in a social movement, second, transnational collective action would depend on the level of mobilization at national or local level. Thus, the modes and repertories of transnational collective action would vary according to the condition and characteristics of domestic social movements and organizations.
An Analytical Framework: Environmental and Developmental Issues
Environmental issues are now located at the center of transnational collective actions and worldwide policy debates. Many international treaties and conferences regarding the solution of environmental problems – or balances between environment and development - now reside in political-economic issues of nations (Broadbent, 1998). The internationalization of environmental collective action is exemplified by the creation of international institutions and the emergence of environmental NGOs at international level (Hass, 1989).16 Along with other policy issues such as human rights and women issues, transnational activism supposedly becomes a new political resource for environmental movements to challenge the traditional image of authorities (Wapner, 1996).17
Keck and Sikkink (1998: 122) note that environmental activism at transnational
16 Environment-related transnational NGOs now compose 28% of the groups (environment NGOs 17%, and sustainability organizations 11%). See Smith (2001b) for more detail information.
17 Transnational environmental activism has a long history and started from the protection movement for migratory birds in 1920. However, transnational environmental activism has been concerned with the developed world’s environmental issues such as acid rain problems in Europe in the late 1960s, nuclear testing issue, and industrial policies in advanced societies (Keck and Sikkink, 1998). From the 1990s, environmental pollutions and overdevelopment issues become a concern for transnational environmental actions.
14
Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy Working Paper
National University of Singapore 2008
level is somewhat different from other types of activism in terms of the target of the activism. That is, the target of movements such as human rights and women movement is clearly the state sovereignty (authority), but environmental issues pose an issue issue property – i.e. economic cost or property value. However, the state still remains a central force in addressing environmental governance issues (Wapner, 1996:8-9). The point is that in addition to the state, TANs work “underneath, above, and around the state” to achieve their policy objectives, a widespread political and social change (Wapner, 1996).
Based on the theoretical context from the globalization and institutional theses, this paper attempted to test hypotheses regarding the condition and influence of transnational environmental collective actions. First, the globalization thesis may assume the following: a) TANs in environmental governance issues would exist in under-developed countries such as Latin America, Africa, and South Asia where policy channels are totally blocked. In addition, domestic environmental movement groups are heavily dependent upon TANs from advanced economies in terms of information, material resources, and so forth. b) Increase of TANs’ activities would cause a decline of state authority and promote democratic process in environmental politics. Second, the institutional thesis may assume the following: a) the activities of TANs would proliferate when the state power is weakened and policy processes are opened. b) Transnational environmental collective actions would rely on the social mobilization at the national or local level. c) The patterns of TANs in environmental governance would vary according to the characteristics of social movement groups - such as ideology, resources, and goal – in a nation.
To test these hypotheses, I scrutinized three debatable environmental movement
15
Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy Working Paper
National University of Singapore 2008
cases in South Korea. As a late industrializer and democratizer, South Korea has experienced ‘transition’ in social structure since the late 1980s. On the one hand, the society has drastically changed from the age of authoritarian rule- i.e. pluralization of political actors. On the other hand, the inheritance of strong governmental authority coming from the era of ‘developmental state’ has still remained deeply in the governance system.18 As stated above, the studies on transnational collective action have focused on advanced countries or developing countries so far, and thus the applications of two contrasting perspectives on transnational societies such as Korea are tested in few literatures.
Three cases in this paper – Shiwha Lake Reclamation, Tong-River Dam Construction, and Saemangum Bay Reclamation – are selected based on the criteria of actors who were involved in the projects. In those cases, there were clear separation of roles, interests, and activities among the government, social movement actors, and TANs, and the result of political dynamics of those cases vary – e.g. failure in Shiwha, success in Tong-River, and pending in Saemangum coast reclamation. Because the time line of analysis ranges from the early 1980s (before democratic transition) to the early 2000s (the period of democratic consolidation), the cases reflect the change of political incorporation and mobilization in environmental governance issues, and provide the basis of testing hypotheses raised.
18 The term ‘developmental state’ in environmental governance context refers to state bureaucrats having control over industrialization and economic development in 1960s-1980s and state’s top priority being economic rehabilitation. Thus, environmental issues were not likely to be recognized as a social problem in late industrializers such as Taiwan, South Korea, and newly industrialized East Asian countries as well as Japan. See Chalmers Johnson (1982), MITI and Japanese Miracle. Stanford: Stanford University Press, and selected articles from Woo-Cumings, Meredith (1999), The Developmental State. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
16
Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy Working Paper
National University of Singapore 2008
Case Analyses: Environmental Disputes in Korea
Shiwha Lake Reclamation: Failure of Mobilization
South Korea – a small peninsula located in the northeast Asia – had been concerned with the procurement of agricultural and industrial lands, because there was limited area available for agriculture and industry. Because approximately 70% of South Korean territory is mountainous terrain, the government struggled to obtain sufficient lands to provide for domestic consumption as well as for industrial use. After experiencing vicious food shortage and rapid industrialization in 1960s and 1970s, the government attempted to implement diverse policy tools to obtain available farmlands and industrial lands. Reclamation was presented as an alternative following to success stories of the Netherlands and Japan.19 In particular, Yellow seashore (West Sea) had a lot of mudflats (wetlands), which could be transformed into reclaimed lands.
In 1985, Economic Planning Bureau (EPB), Ministry of Agriculture (MOA), Ministry of Construction (MOC, now MOCT), and Rural Development Corporation (RDC) announced a plan to reclaim Shiwha Lake to construct a large-scale industrial complex near in Seoul Metropolitan Area (SMA). By building 12.7 km long seawall around Shiwha bay area, the government attempted to convert Shiwha Lake from sea water (salt water) to fresh water lake for irrigation and the provision of industrial water, and at the same time solve the problem of SMA’s overpopulation by providing new apartment complexes.
However, the project was completed in 1994 with devastating side-effects. First,
19 The Netherlands has 740,000 hectare of reclamation area, and 94% of the development was completed. Japan has 300,000 hectare of reclamation area, and 89% of the land was developed (KAIC, 2003).
17
Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy Working Paper
National University of Singapore 2008
before the construction of seawall in Shiwha seashore, the Banwol industrial site where the Shiwha Lake was located had been considered a treasure-house of rare marine life – e.g. 21 species of sea animals and benthos. After the completion, the number drastically decreased to only 4 species.20 Second, mudflats (wetlands), the treasure of ecosystem of marine life were considerably decreased. Mudflats function as housing and feeding grounds for a wide-range of marine life, animals and migratory birds. In addition, it recharges water table, acts as natural filters for polluted waters, and protects the coast from storms and typhoons.21 Third, saline damage from the exposition of mudflats became a serious issue, because salt formed on the surface of the exposed mudflats as a result of the construction of embankment in 1996. Saline component was transported via air damaging the neighboring villages. Finally, for the supply of stones and sands for the construction of the seawall, wild hills and green zones in neighboring Daebu Island and Shiwha district were seriously destroyed.
There has been a growing attention to the considerable environmental damage in Shiwha Lake since the mid 1990s. With increasing complaints about the water quality of Shiwha Lake and the neighborhood environment, the government – especially Ministry of Environment which was established in 1994 – started to be concern about the problems of Shiwha. However, when the level of pollution reached a unmanageable level in the mid-1990s, the Korean Water Company (KOWACO) decided to give up transforming sea water to fresh water, and then it released 810 million ton of untreated water into the Yellow sea without any notification to residents and civic groups (June, 1996).
20 In 2002, BOD (Biochemical Oxygen Demand) level of Shiwha Lake was 19.2 ppm, which was much higher than other lakes and rivers in South Korea (average = around 5 ppm). When the level of pollution reached its height, the level of BOD was much serious (KEFM, http://www.kfem.or.kr).
21 Ramsar Convention on Wetlands of 1971. http://www.ramsar.org.
18
Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy Working Paper
National University of Singapore 2008
The devastating result of Shiwha Lake – what is so called ‘the dead lake’ - project faced strong resistance from citizen movement organizations including environmental activists, politicians in opposition parties, and residents in Shiwha district. They demanded that the government establish a special environment management plan for the “dead lake” to revive the Shiwha Lake and the neighboring areas. Thirty members of Korean Federation for Environmental Movement (KFEM) – one of the largest environmental movement organization in Korea – marched in demonstration in front of KOWACO and Ministry of Environment buildings (June-July, 1996). YMCA and nine scholarly associations held a symposium on Shiwha Lake pollution on July 19, 1996, and KFEM and Citizen Environment Research Institute presented the result of cooperative investigation on the impact of Shiwha Lake pollution on ecosystem in August 1996. Moreover, environmental activists accused bureaucrats in Ministry of Environment and KOWACO of neglecting the duty of environment conservation (June, 1996). However, only a small number of bureaucrats and officials were subjected to disciplinary action by the Board of Audit and Inspection (November, 1996), and the Court dismissed the suit by the activists. In addition, KOWACO never stopped to release million tons of polluted water into the sea.
The question arises, why did those diverse actors’ resistance fail to stop the destructive governmental actions in Shiwha Lake reclamation? First, the lack of information and experience was the main reason why the environmental movements failed. Under the authoritarian rule, the state’s top priority was economic development and industrialization, and thus legislation in 1960s-1980s for environmental protection did not work effectively. There was information asymmetry regarding reclamation
19
Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy Working Paper
National University of Singapore 2008
between the government and environmental activists.22 For example, in 1971 the international community recognized the importance of mudflats and their need for protection in the Ramsar Convention (Iran). There, 117 nations participated in the Convention and 1011 mudflats throughout the world were designated to be protected. Korean government signed onto the Convention in July 1977, but paid little attention to the protection of mudflats because its top priority was development, rather than preservation (Lee, 1999). Both Korean government and environmental activists regarded mudflats as non-productive lands with no monetary or biological value at that time.23
Second, the numbers and activities of environmental movement organizations were not influential. Although there were several important environmental disputes in 1960s-1980s, those relied upon only a small number of activists. Since the democratization in 1987, there had been a rapid increase of environmental movement organizations (Kim, 2000), but their organizational structure, local branches, personnel, and resources were still very weak in the mid 1990s when Shiwha Lake case arose.24
Under these weak structure of environmental mobilization at the national and local level, the problem of Shiwha Lake did not have a chance to be recognized in international environmental society, although some environmental activists had attempted to form international allies by participating in international conferences and meetings. For example, in the process of preparation for United Nations’ Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) in Rio de Janeiro (hereafter Rio Conference) in 1992,
22 Interview, November 13th, 2003.
23 Interview, November 13th, 2003.
24 Among the many environmental movement organizations including a political party (Green Party of Korea) that have established since the late 1980s, only Korean Federation for Environmental Movements and Green Korea had more than 1,000 memberships (Lee, 1999: 102). According to Kim (2000), there were 58 various-sized environmental organizations in 1991-1993. For information regarding the two groups history, see http://www.greenkorea.org and http://www.kfem.or.kr
20
Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy Working Paper
National University of Singapore 2008
environmental organizations took an initiative to hold pre-conferences, got sponsorship from businesses, and so forth. This preparation period gave them an opportunity to do collaborative work with each other (Lee, 1999: 106-107). However, activists who participated in international meetings could not effectively spread and inform of the environmental problems in Korea because, simply put, even Korean activists themselves did not have a profound understanding of the case.25 Accordingly, transnational cooperation could not occur in this case.
Tong-River Dam Construction: Dwindling State
Around the world, one of the most confrontational conflicts over environmental governance and sustainable development has occurred in the debate over construction of dams (Khagram, 2000). In the era of modernization and industrialization, the big dams symbolized that human beings had control over through the means of scientific and technological advances, but skeptics gradually recognized the destructive nature of big dams that impose on astronomical cost to the world (Khagram, 2000). Tong River case is a story of the confrontation between proponents – the government, and opponents – environmental movement organizations – around the construction of big multipurpose dam in Tong River (or Youngwol Dam after the name of the region) which it is famous as a paradise of ecological resources (Lim and Tang, 2002). About three hundred species of plants, including rare species such as Solomon’s seal, Jongsun milk vetch root, arrowroot vines, and so forth, have been observed in Tong River area, and about seventy two species of birds that are ecologically invaluable have been recorded. In addition, there is a limestone cave – Baek-nyong Cave (National Monument No.260) – which toasts a
25 Interview, November 13th, 2003.
21
Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy Working Paper
National University of Singapore 2008
wonderful variety of cave forms such as straight stalactites, stalagmites, stone pillars, and fried egg which are rare in other limestone caves.
After the occurrence of a flood in Seoul Metropolitan Area in 1990, Korea Water Company (KOWACO) which was in charge of water resource management in Korea began to look for a location for a large-scale multipurpose dam26 in the upper stream of Han River.27 KOWACO and Ministry of Construction and Transportation (MOCT) officially announced the construction of the dam on October 20th, 1997. Both governmental branches – KOWACO was a public enterprise – assured shortage of water supply in the early 2000s and the threat of flood in the SMA. However, the plan brought severe confrontations from the opposition body – environmental movement organizations, Kang-won Province residents and the Ministry of Environment – because the construction of the dam would mean the submergence of an ecologically important area and of the limestone cave in Youngwol area.
On the surface, KOWACO and MOCT faithfully followed the newly legislated Environmental Impact Assessment Act (EIA) of 1993, but it turned out that the initial EIA report and several amendments did not appropriately investigate the actual full impact of the construction of the dam (Lim and Tang, 2002:568).28 Despite their imperfect preparation for environmental protection of the Tong River region, however, KOWACO and MOTC attempted to start the dam construction without the approval of Ministry of Environment (October, 1999), and this illegal attempt brought irresolvable
26 Big dams are those taller than 15 meter – the height of four-story buildings, and Tong River dam was planned to be 98 meter high (Khagram, 2000).
27 Tong River is located on the northeast side of Korean peninsula (in Kang-won Province).
28 Also see Hye Jeong Kim (1999), Anti-dam Movements of Korea: Focuse on the Tong River Dam. Paper presented at the Environmental NGOs’ International Symposium on Dams, November 29-30, 1999. http://www.kfem.or.kr/engkfem/issue/damsympo/damsympo_e7.html.
22
Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy Working Paper
National University of Singapore 2008
controversy over the dam construction. The core of the controversy over the construction was: a) water shortage and threat of flood, and b) the threat of earthquake.
As soon as the government officially announced the construction of the dam, many environmental activists, professionals, and residents in Kang-won Province strongly opposed the plan. Especially, Korean Federation for Environmental Movements (KFEM) led a campaign for the preservation of Tong River Preservation by using various tactics. First, KFEM and other civic associations endeavored to inform the general public of the problems surrounding Tong River Dam construction by hosting nation-wide petition campaign (August, 1998), street protests (1998-1999), and various cultural activities (performing play regarding environmental protection, religious activities, and the exhibitions of pictures and paintings of natural environment of Tong River).
Second, by hosting professional conferences and symposiums, environmental groups attempted to propose alternative policies that would solve the environmental issues. For example, KFEM and Research Institute for Earthquake at Hanyang University reported the result of an investigation that showed the risk of earthquake in the Tong River region (KFEM website), and KFEM conducted a research on the limestone caves with the support from Korean Association for Cave Studies (October 1998). In addition, KFEM held the International Symposium on Dam in the late November of 1999 to form transnational support groups.
Third, to inform the problems of the government’s policy known and initiate public participation in the movement, environmental and civic groups used extensive media coverage because the general public was not familiar with the issues surrounding Tong River regions. The effect of media coverage resulted in widespread recognition of
23
Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy Working Paper
National University of Singapore 2008
and participation in the Tong River issue by the public, and this tactic was critical to gain support from the general public.29 In addition, the activists and organizations made postcards, T-shirts, and other items solicit attention from the public.
Compounding the effect of oppositions by environmental and civic organizations was the emergence of the transnational actors who had thus far rarely in the movement against the project. In September of 1998, environmental organizations invited the former chairman of Sierra Club of the United States to raise the safety issue of Tong River Dam – especially regarding the risk of constructing a dam in a limestone area. In April of 1999, many transnational advocacy organizations such as Green Peace, Sierra Club, Friends of Earth, World Watch Institute, and International Rivers Network USA presented declarations that asked the government to abandon the construction of the dam. Those advocacy groups sent letters directly to the government officials and the President. Meanwhile, domestic environmental groups sent their representatives to international conferences to present the problems and seek supports on the Tong River issue. Also, KFEM official participated in the World Commission on Dams to present the report on Anti-Tong River Dam movement in Korea.30
As the alliance among both domestic and transnational NGOs as well as scholars and politicians strengthened, President Kim Dae Jung implicitly expressed that the construction of Tong River Dam would be reconsidered (August 1999), and the project was eventually called off in June of 2000. Tong River case exemplified the drastic changes in modes, resources, and policy channel of environmental movement in Korea.
29 For example, in April of 1999, Korea Broadcasting System (KBS) broadcasted a documentary featuring the beauty and value of Tong River region which has invaluable ecological features.
30 The World Commission on Dams was held in Hanoi Vietnam, February 26-27, 2000. http://www.dams.org.
24
Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy Working Paper
National University of Singapore 2008
Traditional state-led development now faced challenges from civil society including various private actors, and transnational advocacy networks emerged in the domestic policy processes as a new stakeholder. In this case, environmental movement groups successfully mobilized the public’s attention, and by actively participating in international meetings and networks, they successfully acquired support from TANs.
Saemangum Bay Reclamation: Continuing Struggles
Based on the experience from the tragedy of “the dead lake,” – Shiwha Lake reclamation – environmental groups and epistemic communities including scholars and researchers strongly opposed another massive reclamation of Saemangum Bay which had started in November of 1991. Increased public awareness and the imminent loss of the Saemangum mudflats heightened Koreans’ perception of the danger of reclamation and the value of mudflats.
Saemangum is located in the southwestern part of Korea and is considered to be one of the five most ecologically important mudflats in the world (KFEM website). Mudflats in Saemangum make up a unique natural environment that play a crucial role as the feeding grounds for migratory birds that spend winter in Australia and summer in Siberia. The mudflats are located between Mankyeong and Dong-jin rivers, and the flowing water of the rivers provides rich nutrition and food to many kinds of sea-life where one square meter of mudflats house thousands of marine creatures. More than 50% of waterfowls and snipes visit the Saemangum region every spring and autumn for feeding and nesting.
The region is a large bay with about 41,000 hectare of mudflats. Thus, for a long
25
Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy Working Paper
National University of Singapore 2008
time, the region was considered to be the best area for reclamation to expand national territory to meet the demands of agricultural and industrial needs. The reclamation would add 28,300 hectare of agricultural lands and 11,800 hectare of artificial Saemangum Lake by constructing 33km-long seawall, which would be the longest one in the world. Accordingly, the budget for the project was historically unprecedented 19,335 million dollars (KAIC, 2003).31
By designing the project an “environmentally friendly development,” the government promised that the Saemangum reclamation would differ from the tragedy of Shiwha Lake. To avoid conflict with environmental organizations, the government – including Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry (MOAF), KAIC, and North Cholla Provincial government – suggested organizing a “Joint Civic-Government Research Team” to scrutinize the cost-benefit and environmental impact of the project (1999).32 In addition, the Office of Prime Minister (OPM) and the Sustainable Development Committee held several public hearings to gather diverse opinions on the project (2001), opened a portal website to publicize their policy and development plan, and published numerous reports with an emphasis on conservative development. The ruling New Millennium Democratic Party (NMDP) launched a public-private special committee, namely “Saemangum Special Committee” to persuade both public and expert groups (2003). Through these various procedural strategies, the government attempted to legitimize the project.33
In contrast, participants and strategies of environmental groups became more and
31 Based on the current exchange rate (one dollar = 1,004 Korean won).
32 The team was composed of thirty experts, bureaucrats, and scholars, and among them ten members were recommended by environmental movement groups (Kim, 2003: 13).
33 In addition, the governmental actors used foreign countries’ successes in reclamation (e.g. the Netherlands and Japan) to defend themselves from environmental groups’ attack.
26
Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy Working Paper
National University of Singapore 2008
more diversified. First of all, based on the growth of size, material resources, personnel, etc., many environmental groups as well as other social movement groups such as religious groups collectively responded to the government regarding the Saemangum case. By walking from Saemangum to Seoul – hundreds of kilometers – for 60 days while praying for natural conservation in an expression of their resistance, environmental leaders such as Yeol Choi and religious groups – especially Catholics and Buddhists – held a symbolic event, namely “Three Steps and One Bow” movement (Sambo Il-bae movement).34
Second, the modes of the collective actions for Saemangum35 preservation became more and more diversified. Although the activists knew that they would lose the cases - because citizen lawsuits were not legalized at that time - they continuously sued the government agencies and officials for misuse of public power (2000). The big environmental movement groups established “public litigation center” to support several citizen litigations. Along with the explosion of internet users and the revolution of information technology in Korea, maintaining portal website for environmental movement became a useful tool to mobilize people in environmental issues (Bosso and Collins, 2002; Yun, 2003).36
Finally, some of environmental groups showed tremendous growth in terms of their size, resource, and influence since the mid-1990s. For example, KFEM now has 80,000 memberships, about forty local branches, its own research center (Citizen Environmental Research Institute), and litigation center (Environmental Litigation
34 According to monk Su-Kyeong, three steps symbolize overcoming greed, ignorance, and anger, while one bow symbolizes apologies for the destruction of the environment.
35 Because Korean government did not legislate citizen lawsuit (or group litigation), the environmental activists were not licit plaintiffs. The lawsuits were initiated by activists in Green Korea United and KFEM.
36 About various tactics of environmental movements, see Dalton et al.(2003).
27
Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy Working Paper
National University of Singapore 2008
Center). Most activist leaders in the organization are highly-educated – with at least master’s degree (KFEM website; Lee, 1999). Another big environmental group, Green Korea United (hereafter GKU) also became one of the largest environmental organizations that has over 15,000 memberships.
Along with the rapid growth of size, budget, and expertise, Korean environmental groups now have a advantageous climate to challenge the state policies. With above diverse tools and modes of movement, environmental groups were successfully checking governmental developmental projects and environmental pollutions (Lim and Tang, 2002). Accordingly, for the government, avoiding confrontation with environmental groups became the most formidable task in policy making and implementation in Korea.
In the Saemangum case, diverse transnational advocacy networks emerged in the process. First of all, many staff in environmental organizations – individually or collectively – have regularly participated in international meetings and conferences related to environmental governance issues, and attempted to present the case of Saemangum reclamation to international colleagues.37 In May 1999, international environmental activists participating in the 7th Ramsar Convention in Costa Rica criticized the Korean government and discussed how the Saemangum project damaged the ecology of the coastal wetlands. By the end of the Convention, a declaration was drawn up, namely “People and Wetlands: A Vital Link” and the government was asked to stop the development (KFEM website).38
Japanese NPOs39 working for anti-Isahaya Bay reclamation movement partly
37 It was not until 1997 that KEFM members participated in international conferences. Interview, November 14th, 2003.
38 This is what is so called, “Declaration of San Jose,” Costa Rica on Dams and Wetlands.
39 For example, Japan Wetlands Action Network.
28
Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy Working Paper
National University of Singapore 2008
funded small grants for anti-Saemangum movement, because both cases were very similar.40 In addition, Korean environmental movement leaders obtained information regarding migratory birds from transnational NGOs such as the Wetland International, and regularly exchanged correspondence with their transnational colleagues via email – especially with Japanese counterpart.41 Furthermore, the leaders actively participated in international conferences, and presented and reported on the situation of Saemangum reclamation. As a result, some famous transnational activists who were interested in the case visited Saemangum and participated in the Three Steps and One Bow movement in of May 2003.42 The chairman of Friends of Earth visited Korea and wrote letters to the President and ministers to persuade them to abandon of the project. As Paul Wapner (1996: 125-126) observed, FOE recognized the important role of state in maintaining the ecosystem in Korea, and the chairman tried to contact government officials directly.43
As a result of various activities and networks at both domestic and transnational levels, the Seoul Administrative Court decided to temporarily stop the construction of Saemangum seawall, 31 km of 33 km of which was completed, and made recommendations to reconsider the project by forming a special committee under the National Assembly or the Office of President (2005) which would re-evaluate the validity of the project.
40 Korean activists used to get small travel grants from international organizations when they participated in international conferences, but such supports ended when Korea gained membership in OECD countries (interview, November 14th, 2003).
41 Interview, November 14th, 2003.
42 Australian senator of Green Party and Japanese lawyers and activist groups visited Korea to support anti-Saemangum project.
43 Senior Conservation Fellow of Sierra Club, Edward A. Mainland also sent letters to the President, the Minister of Agriculture and Forestry, Minister of Environment, and so forth.
29
Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy Working Paper
National University of Singapore 2008
Discussion: Testing Hypotheses
Closer investigation of three environmental governance cases in this paper shows that there has been a rapid growth of environmental movement networks both transnationally and domestically. In comparison with before democratization and earlier democratization periods from 1980s to the early 1990s, there have been clear changes in the openness of policy channels, access to information and political authorities, and democratic processes (e.g. Lim and Tang, 2002). Table 1 summarizes the brief discussion on components of institutional context of the cases.
Table 1. Case Analyses: A Closer Look
Shiwha Lake
Tong River Dam
Saemangum
Institutional Context
(Democracy)
Moderate
Strong
Strong
Environmental Movement Organizations
weak
strong
strong
Level of Mobilization
Weak
Strong
Strong
State Authority
Strong
Moderate
Moderate
The Role of TANs
None
Moderate
Moderate
Policy Outcome
Failure
Success
Pending / Success
First of all, in terms of institutional context, environmental movements seen in Tong River Dam and Saemangum reclamation projects in the democratic consolidation period (after the late 1990s) took place under stronger democratic circumstance in policy making and implementation. More participants, diversified policy channels, material resources, direct elections, and guarantee of constitutional rights (e.g. freedom of speech
30
Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy Working Paper
National University of Singapore 2008
and collective action) were indispensable institutional context that facilitated social mobilization in environmental governance issue (Kim, 2000; Lee, 1999; Lim and Tang, 2002). A high-level of social mobilization in environmental movements occurred under a more democratic and open mobilization structure unlike the implications of globalization thesis and prototypical Latin American exemplary cases. Globalization theorists argue that the activities of TANs would occur in developing countries where policy channels were totally blocked. However unlike Latin American cases in Keck and Sikkink’s seminal work, the activities of TANs have proliferated in a more open political structure in the Korean context – i.e. constitutional political rights, the growth of Ministry of Environment in the government, freedom of mass media, and so on. Table 2 shows the rapid growth of membership in environmental organizations. As shown in the table, membership in environmental organizations has increased tremendously since the mid 1990, and the level of activity is higher than that of other advanced economies such as Japan and Germany.
Table 2. Membership in Environmental Groups Since 1980
Country
1981-1982
1990-1991
1995-1997
S. Korea
2.7 (2.3)
4.2 (2.4)
25.0 (6.2)
Japan
0.6 (0.4)
1.5 (1.2)
3.1 (1.4)
United States
5.1 (1.4)
8.2 (3.5)
25.3 (9.1)
Germany
3.3 (1.0)
4.8 (1.4)
11.8 (3.0)
1. Unit: Percentage (%)
2. Note: the number in parenthesis is the percentage of active member.
3. Source: World Values Survey (1981, 1990, 1995).
It is interesting to note that Korean environmental organizations did not receive substantial support – such as information and financial support – from the transnational
31
Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy Working Paper
National University of Singapore 2008
networks from advanced economies, though the networks were considered important to legitimize their discourses against governmental policies.44 Rather, they frequently contacted environmental organizations in the third world countries such as Thailand that were experiencing similar environmental disasters resulting from the development. Based on the experience of the failure of Shiwha Lake, activists had already collected a lot of information regarding the effect of reclamation by cooperating with scholarly research institute and establishing their own research centers with highly-educated staff, although information from transnational allies and conferences also played an important role. Interestingly, financial support for environmental groups in Korea came mainly from the government’s grant-in-aid (Bae, 2004).45
Consequently, in the process of the other two environmental movement successes, substantial changes in institutional context (democratic consolidation, local autonomy, and opened participation) and environmental groups’ capacity (expertise, finance, and mobilization) resulted in favorable climate in which transnational cooperation could take place. According to the cases and interviews, the activities of TANs were “symbolically” powerful resources to domestic environmental groups as Keck and Sikkink (1998) pointed out, though it is still inaccurate to say that the activities themselves were an independent factor of successful environmental movements. Under the democratic consolidation, domestic environmental groups used the transnational networks to legitimize their activities, and thus transnational cooperation is a extention of domestic environmental movements (Rohrschneider and Dalton, 2002). One of the interviewees
44 Rather, they frequently contacted third world environmental organizations – such as those of Thailand – that were experiencing similar environmental disputes.
45 Interestingly, East Asian – especially Japanese and Korean – civic groups get financial support from the government. By following the NPO Law (Japan) and Non-Profit Organizations Aid Law (NPOAL, Korea), the governments fund non-profit organization’s activities (Bae, 2004).
32
Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy Working Paper
National University of Singapore 2008
recalled the following:
“…[…]…because we thought that transnational environmental groups and institutions were very well known among Korean people and bureaucrats, we expected that we could get substantial or at least symbolic benefits from transnational cooperation…[…]…environmental movements in Korea after the 1990s are very strong, but internationally who knows of Saemangum and Three Steps and One Bow movement?...[…]...”46
Conclusion: Toward A Multilevel Analysis
The objective of this paper was to testify the contrasting perspectives on transnational cooperation on social issues within a nation by emphasizing the condition and tactics of transnational advocacy networks. Three case studies in this paper provide substantial information regarding the evolution of environmental movements in a transitional society – i.e. economically and politically more or less advanced, but still with the legacy of strong state – that were not sufficiently studied in social movement literatures. The cases shows that there was growing attention among domestic environmental groups to the fact that the sharing of information and experience, discussion of environmental problems that were commonly shared, and the search for transnational allies beyond national border were very important to the success of the challenges against governmental policies. International discourses on domestic environmental governance issues acted as powerful tools to diffuse commonly accepted norms and testimony to worldwide.
At the same time, empirical analyses in the case studies raise questions on the globalization theorists’ argument on transnational activism. The globalization thesis
46 Interview, November 14th, 2003.
33
Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy Working Paper
National University of Singapore 2008
assumes that the transnational cooperation will occur mainly in underdeveloped or developing countries, because the activities of TANs required highly-educated expertise, enough material resources and information that mainly came from the North. Also they argue that the proliferation of TANSs would weaken the state authority in a nation by increasing democratic processes. However, the empirical evidence in a transitional society – Korea – shows that making transnational allies relied on institutional contexts and policy settings in a nation, and mobilization at the national and local levels was a more critical element in the success of environmental movement. Under the democratic circumstance, transnational cooperation was likely to occur as the empirical evidence showed. The problem with the globalization thesis is its tendency to overemphasize the role of norms and underplay the role of state power. The idea that transnational advocacy networks are able to compete against or even constrain state powers needs to be qualified by pointing out that the effectiveness of TANs depends a great deal on the nature and context of the state.
The Korean environmental movement cases show that under the democratic consolidation period, both domestic and transnational cooperation among environmental groups proliferated. More open political opportunity structure and diversified policy channels were likely to provide advantageous circumstances for the emergence of transnational cooperation. Although the activities of TANs gained increasing importance as an indispensable political resources to act as a supporting structure to legitimize parties that opposed state policies, “nation” and “locality” are still remained as basic political battle fields.
The general implication of this paper toward the study of social movement is the
34
Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy Working Paper
National University of Singapore 2008
necessity of “multilevel” analysis (Keohane and Nye, 2000; Sellers, 2002). Globalization is strongly affecting domestic governing processes, but without careful investigation on national and local infrastructure and policy settings, it is hard to understand why each country shows different patterns of transnational cooperation as well as domestic social movement. A close investigation of transnational-national-local tie may tell the full story without losing insight from the globalization thesis.
35
Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy Working Paper
National University of Singapore 2008
REFRENCE
Anheier, Helmut, Marlies Glasius, and Mary Kaldor (eds.). 2002. Global Civil Society 2002. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Bae, Yooil. 2004. State, Policy, and Social Capital: An Institutional Approach on Social Capital Theory. Korean Review of Policy Studies 13(4): 131-156 (in Korean).
Beeson, Mark. 2001. Globalization, Governance, and the Political-Economy of Public Policy Reform in East Asia. Governance 14(4): 481-502.
Bosso, Christopher J. and Michael Thomas Collins. 2002. Just Another Tool? How Environmental Groups Use the Internet. In Allan J. Cigler and Burdett A. Loomis (eds.), Interest Group Politics (6th edition). Washington D.C.: CQ Press, pp.95-116.
Broadbent, Jeffrey. 1998. Environmental Politics in Japan: Networks of Power and Protest. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Castells, Manuel. 2005. Global Governance and Global Politics. PS: Political Science and Politics XXXVIII (1): 9-16.
Chung, Jun-Keum. 2000. Development, Preservation, and Conflict Management: Focus on Saemangum Reclamation Project. Korea Institute of Public Administration Journal 9(4): 79-103.
Dalton, Russell J. and Robert Rohrschneider. 2003. The Environmental Movement and the Modes of Political Action. Comparative Political Studies 36(7): 743-771.
Flanagan, Scott C. and Aie-Rie Lee. 2000. Value Change and Democratic Reform in Japan and Korea. Comparative Political Studies 33(6): 626-659.
Florini, Ann (ed.). 2000. The Third Face: The Rise of Transnational Civil Society. Tokyo: Japan Center for International Exchange.
Garrett, G. and Lange P. 1995. Internationalization, Institutions, and Political Change. International Organizations 49(4): 627-655.
Giddens, Anthony. 1990. The Consequences of Modernity. Cambridge: Polity Press.
Hall, Peter A. 1986. Governing the Economy: The Politics of State Intervention in Britain and France. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Hall, Rodney Bruce, and Thomas J. Biersteker. 2002. The Emergence of Private Authority in Global Governance. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Hass, Peter. 1989. Do Regimes Matter? Epistemic Communities and Mediterranean Pollution Control. International Organization 43(3): 377-403.
He, Baogang. 2004. Transnational Civil Society and the National Identity Question in East Asia. Global Governance 10: 227-246.
Held, David, Anthony McGrew, David Goldblatt, and Jonathan Perraton. 1999. Global Transformations: Politics, Economics, and Culture. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Held, David and Anthony McGrew. 2004. The Great Globalization Debate: An Introduction. In David Held and Anthony McGrew (eds.). The Global Transformations Reader: An Introduction to the Globalization Debate. London: Polity, pp.1-50.
Hirst, P. and G. Thompson. 1996. Globalization in Question: The International Economy and the Possibility of Governance. Cambridge: Polity Press.
36
Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy Working Paper
National University of Singapore 2008
Kahler, Miles and David A. Lake. 2003. Globalization and Changing Patterns of Political Authority. In Miles Kahler and David A. Lake (eds.), Governance in a Global Economy: Political Authority in Transition. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, pp.412-438.
Keane, John. 2003. Global Civil Society? Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Keck, Margaret E. and Kathryn Sikkink. 1998. Activist Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Keohane, Robert and Joseph Nye Jr. 2000. Globalization: What’s New? What’s Not? (And So What?). Foreign Policy (Spring): 104-119.
______. 2003. Redefining Accountability for Global Governance. In Miles Kahler and David A. Lake (eds.), Governance in a Global Economy: Political Authority in Transition. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, pp.386-411.
Khagram, Sanjeev. 2000. Toward Democratic Governance for Sustainable Development: Transnational Civil Society Organizing Around Big Dams. In Ann M. Florini (ed.), The Third Face: The Rise of Transnational Civil Society. Tokyo: Japan Center for International Exchange, pp.83-114.
Kim, Sunhyuk. 2000. The Politics of Democratization in Korea: The Role of Civil Society. Pittsburgh: Pittsburgh University Press.
Kim, Seoyong. 2003. Irresolvable Cultural Conflicts and Conversation / Development Arguments: Analysis of Korea’s Saemangum Project. Policy Science 36: 125-149.
Korean Agricultural and Rural Infrastructure Corporation (KARIC). 2003. Understanding Saemangum Project. Unpublished Report (in Korean).
Korean Federation for Environmental Movements (KFEM) website, http://www.kfem.or.kr.
Inglehart, Ronald. 1997. Modernization and Post-Modernization: Cultural, Economic, and Political Change in 43 Societies. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Lee, Su-Hoon. 1999. Environmental Movements in South Korea. In Yok-Shiu F. Lee and Alvin Y. So (eds.), Asia’s Environmental Movements: Comparative Perspectives. New York: M. E. Sharpe, pp.90-119.
Lim, Joon Hyong and Sui Yan Tang. 2002. Democratization and Environmental Policymaking in Korea. Governance 15(4): 561-582.
Lipschutz, Ronnie D. 2004. Global Environmental Politics: Power, Perspectives, and Practice. Washington D.C.: CQ Press.
McCarthy, John D. 1997. The Globalization of Social Movement Theory. In Jackie Smith, Charles Chatfield and Ron Pagnucco (eds.), Transnational Social Movements and Global Politics: Solidarity Beyond the State. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, pp.243-259.
Ministry of Environment (MOE) website, http://www.moe.go.kr.
Nye, Joseph S. and John D. Donahue. 2000. Governance in a Globalizing World. Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution.
Pierre, Jon (ed.). 2000. Debating Governance. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Porta, Donatella, Hanspeter Kriesi, and Dieter Rucht.1999. Social Movements in a Globalizing World. New York: St. Martin’s Press.
Putnam, Robert D. 1988. Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Game. International Organizations 42(3): 427-460.
Reimann, Kim. 2003. Building Global Civil Society from the Outside In? Japanese
37
Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy Working Paper
National University of Singapore 2008
38
International Development NGOs, the State, and International Norms. In Frank J. Schwartz and Susan J. Pharr (eds.), The State of Civil Society in Japan. New York: Cambridge University Press, pp.298-315.
Rohrschneider, Robert and Russell J. Dalton. 2002. A Global Network? Transnational Cooperation among Environmental Groups. Journal of Politics 64(2): 510-533.
Rosenau, James N. 2000. Change, Complexity, and Governance in a Globalizing Space. In Jon Pierre (ed.), Debating Governance. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp.167-200.
Rucht, Dieter. 1999. The Transnationalization of Social Movements: Trends, Causes, Problmes. In Donatella della Porta et al. (eds.), Social Movements in a Globalizing World. New York: St. Martin’s Press, pp.206-224.
Schreurs, Miranda A. 2002. Environmental Politics in Japan, Germany, and the United States. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Shin, Doh Chull. 2003. Mass Politics, Public Opinion, and Democracy in Korea. In Samuel S. Kim (ed.), Korea’s Democratization. New York: Cambridge University Press, pp.47-77.
Smith, Jackie. 1997. Characteristics of the Modern Transnational Social Movement Sector. In Jackie Smith et al. (eds.), Transnational Social Movements and Global Politics: Solidarity Beyond the State. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, pp.42-58.
______. 2001a.Global Civil Society? Transnational Society Movements Organizations and Social Capital. In Bob Edwards, Michael W. Foley, and Mario Diani (eds.). Beyond Tocqueville: Civil Society and the Social Capital Debate in Comparative Perspective. London: Tufts University Press, pp.194-206.
______.2001b. Transnational Social Movement Organizations and Global Democracy. Paper presented at the International Workshop on Transnational Activism and Problem of Democracy in East and Southeast Asia., Nordic Institute of Asian Studies and Department of Political Science, Soderton University College, Stockholm, Sweden, September 14-15, 2001.
Strange, Susan. 1996. The Retreat of the State: The Diffusion of Power in the World Economy. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Tarrow, Sidney. 2000. Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics (2nd edition). New York: Cambridge University Press.
______. 1998. Fishnets, Internets, and Catnets: Globalization and Transnational Collective Action. In Michael Hanaga (ed.), Challenging Autohrity. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
______. 1996. Social Movements in Contentious Politics: A Review Article. American Political Science Review 90(4): 874-883.
Wapner, Paul. 1996. Environmental Activism and World Civic Politics. Albany: SUNY Press.
Warkentin, Craig. 2001. Reshaping World Politics: NGOs, the Internet, and Global Civil Society. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield.
Woo-Cumings, Meredith. 1999. The Developmental State. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.